INTRODUCTION * *
Various instances of the use of condictio claims in different periods of Roman law and in correspondingly different procedural arrangements may be said to have had a generally very important role in the Roman law of obligations. For example, the condictio claims were used to reclaim a payment of indebitum (nondebt), payment of a sum given over in expectation of an event that eventually * Henrik-Riko Held, Ph. D., Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Zagreb, Trg Republike Hrvatske 14, Zagreb; hheld@pravo.hr; ORCID ID: orcid.org/0000-0002- did not occur, payment of a sum on a legal basis that later ceased to exist, etc. 1 Therefore, it could be said that condictio claims were a sort of remedy for certain pecuniary imbalances that occurred in practice. For that reason, they are often associated with philosophical concepts and principles such as justice, equity, natural law, good faith, etc. in the sources, as it will be shown in the following analysis.
2
Taking those concepts and principles into consideration, the aim of this paper is to try to clarify whether any actual philosophical thought inspired Roman law in the pre-classical and classical periods in regard to condictio claims, and if it did, in what way and in what measure. Besides having academic relevance, this issue bears importance given that the classical condictio claims were the basis for the Justinianic system of the condictiones, which in turn was subject of the medieval treatment of the matter and later reception of Roman law in Europe.
In order to analyse this problem thoroughly, three different aspects of the issue should be dealt with. Firstly, the long-standing problem of the alleged postclassical interpolations of the concepts and principles associated with condictio claims, the matter that traditionally drew the most attention, should be revisited. Secondly, when the most likely timeframe of the origins of those concepts and principles is established, the next matter to be dealt with is the issue of the ostensible philosophical school that played the most important part therein. After that, it is discussed to which extent the pertinent philosophical school may have directly affected condictio claims in pre-classical and classical Roman law. With such a three-tier approach, we hope to contribute to a more thorough understanding of the condictio claims both in Roman law and in their later iterations throughout history. 1 On the matter in general, with detailed references to the sources and relevant literature, see Kaser, M., Das römische Privatrecht I (das altrömische, das vorklassische und klassische Recht) , München, 1971, pp. 592 Similarly, contemporary legal systems, in fields that may be associated with condictio claims (for example, unjustified enrichment), generally also acknowledge this philosophical and dogmatic aspect of the matter. For an analysis regarding the dogmatic aspects of unjustified enrichment in Germany (ungerechtfertigte Bereicherung) see Gödicke, P., Bereicherungsrecht und Dogmatik, Berlin, 2002 . For an overview of a number of relevant issues in this regard in common law jurisdictions, see Chambers, R. et al. (eds.) , Philosophical Foundations of the Law of Unjust Enrichment, Oxford, 2009 . For Croatian literature on the matter see Klarić, P.; Vedriš, M., Građansko pravo, Zagreb, 2006, p. 644 and Vojković, L., Kondikcijski tužbeni zahtjevi (unpublished thesis) , Split, 1997, pp. 22 sqq.
THE PROBLEM OF THE ORIGINS OF THE PRINCIPLES ASSOCIATED WITH CONDICTIO CLAIMS -A POSTCLASSICAL INTERPOLATION?
Fragments from Justinian's Digesta dealing with condictio claims contain numerous references to concepts and principles such as justice, equity, natural law, etc. In one of the most famous fragments in that regard, attributed to the famous 2 nd century jurist Pomponius 3 , D. 12, 6, 14 (Pomp. 21 ad sab.), it is stated:
Nam hoc natura aequum est neminem cum alterius detrimento fieri locupletiorem.
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According to the fragment, it is in line with natural equity never to enrich oneself to the detriment of another. This reference has been generally associated with the so-called condictio indebiti, or the use of the condictio claim in the case of the payment of the indebitum, in a sense that the keeping of a received indebitum is inequitable and that the payment should be transferred back. 5 The fragment is within the Digesta thus fittingly situated under the 6 th titulus of the 12 th book, titled De condictione indebiti. Regarding the reception of Roman law and the contemporary legal systems, the principle contained in the fragment has always been associated with the condictio indebiti. 6 However, it should be noted that this fragment in its context within the Digesta might have been related to a slightly different matter. The immediately preceding fragment, with which there is a connection via the word nam, deals with the ward who has received mutuum without auctoritas tutoris, and who, after having paid his debt upon reaching full age, cannot request back what he has paid. 7 The following fragment, which has been cited, confirms this by stating that such a conclusion in this case is warranted by natural equity. Therefore, the apparent context for the rule contained in the cited D. 12, 6, 14 (Pomp. 21 ad sab.) is not a confirmation of the main rule for condictio indebiti, but rather a justification for one of its exceptions. For it is by nature fair that nobody should enrich himself at the expense of another (translation from Watson, A. (ed.) , The Digest of Justinian I-IV (English language translation), Philadelphia, 1985, vol. I, p. 380) . 5 Cf. Zimmerman, op. cit. n. 1, p. 852 . More on the so-called condictio indebiti in classical law in Kaser, op. cit. n. 1 (1971), p. 596; Zimmerman, op. cit. n. 1, pp. 848 sqq. and in postclassical law Kaser, op. cit. n. 1 (1975), pp. 422 sq. This is true at least in the context of the Digesta, since the two fragments are attributed to different authors, D. 12, 6, 14 (Pomp. 21 ad sab.) to Pomponius, and the immediately preceding D. 12, 6, 13, 1 (Paul. 10 ad sab.) to Paulus 9 , and therefore the context of the expressed principle in the Pomponius' original work may have been different. However, even in the Digesta the essentially same rule has been given the authority of a general rule of law, therefore applicable also in the field of condictio claims. In the 17 th titulus of the 50 th book of the Digesta, which deals with different regulae iuris (De diversis regulis iuris antiqui), D. 50, 17, 206 (Pomp. 9 ex var. lect.) , by the same Pomponius, reads:
Iure naturae aequum est neminem cum alterius detrimento et iniuria fieri locupletiorem.
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The differences in relation to D. 12, 6, 14 (Pomp. 21 ad sab.) cited earlier are that in the present fragment natural law is referenced explicitly, instead of only nature (ius naturae and not natura), and as an additional prerequisite for the prohibition of enrichment, along with the detriment of another, iniuria (unlawfulness) is also named.
Ostensibly, even in the original context of the cited fragments, the condictio claim in the case of indebitum may have been strongly associated with nature and natural law, at least according to Lenel. To begin with, regarding the firstly mentioned D. 12, 6, 14 (Pomp. 21 ad sab.), in the reconstruction of Pomponius' Libri ad Sabinum, Lenel situated the mentioned fragment at the very beginning of the part titled De condictione, apparently awarding it the force of a general rule.
11 Further, regarding the preceding fragment in Digesta, D. 12, 6, 13, 1 (Paul. 10 ad sab.) , what follows in the reconstruction of Paul's Libri ad Sabinum is another general principle, namely Indebiti soluti condictio naturalis est. 12, 13 This is essentially the same principle as the one contained in D. 12, 6, 14 (Pomp. 21 ad sab.). Thus, it could be said that the natural law principle of prohibition of enrichment to the detriment of another, as expressed in D. 12, 9 More on Paulus in Kunkel, op. cit. n. 3, pp. 244 sq. 10 By the law of nature it is fair that no one become richer by the loss and injury of another (translation from Watson, op. cit. n. 4 (vol. IV) , p. 483).
11 Lenel, O., Palingenesia iuris civilis II, Leipzig, 1889, p. 129. 12 Lenel, O., Palingenesia iuris civilis I, Leipzig, 1889 Leipzig, , p. 1281 The phrase is the beginning of D. 12, 6, 15 pr. (Paul. 10 ad sab.), translated: The condictio is based on natural reason (translation from Watson, op. cit. n. 4 (vol. I) , p. 380).
6, 14 (Pomp. 21 ad sab.) and almost identically in D. 50, 17, 206 (Pomp. 9 ex var. lect.) , is intrinsically associated with condictio claims. In addition, there are numerous other instances where various applications of condictio claims are explicitly associated with such concepts as natura and ius naturae, with different terminological variants. 14, 15 Besides natural law and its conceptual and terminological derivatives, there are many other similar references in fragments dealing with condictio claims. For example, association of the condictio claims with ius gentium, which was largely influenced by natural law and in which good faith (bona fides) played a very important role. 16 Abteilung, vol. 105, 1988, pp. 702-711; Levy, E., Natural Law in Roman Thought, Studia et documenta historiae et iuris, vol. 15, 1949, pp. 1-24; Albertario, E., Studi di diritto romano V: Storia, metodologia, esegesi, Milano, 1937, pp. 277 sqq.; Koschembahr-Łyskowski, I ., Naturalis ratio en droit classique romain, in: Studi in onore di Pietro Bonfante, vol. III, 1930, pp. 467-498. 16 Cf. mention of ius gentium in the same context in Zimmerman, op. cit. n. 1, p. 853. More on the concept of ius gentium in Roman law generally in Mayer-Maly, T., Das ius gentium bei den späteren Klassikern, IVRA, vol. 34, 1983, pp. 91- 19, 20 This text indicates that a condictio in a specific case was introduced on account of equity (bonum et aequum). This, alongside previously enumerated instances of association of condictio claims with concepts and principles such as natura, ius naturae, ius gentium, aequitas and their derivatives, has been a matter of dispute in literature. To be more specific, it has been argued by some scholars of Roman law that those principles were typical postclassical concepts, interpolated into the classical texts. The ostensibly vague and ambiguous nature of those principles was considered uncharacteristic for classical casuistic jurisprudence. The principle of prohibition of enrichment to the detriment of another, which was also brought into connection with condictio claims in the sources, as shown above, was even credited to the influence of Christianity in postclassical law. 23 However, it seems that it may not be justified to deny a possibility of the influence of such philosophical concepts on an action in classical Roman law in general. In one case at least an action was apparently awarded explicitly on the basis of nature and natural equity, and such an opinion is credited to Labeo, a famous lawyer from the age of August. 24 In addition, the argument that condictio as an actio stricti iuris could not have had anything to do with concepts such as natural law and equity may not be necessarily correct, taking into account the general functioning of Roman civil procedure. To be more exact, the fact that an action was stricti iuris, and as such generally not subject to any considerations of equity 25 , did not hinder the opportunity of the iudex in the second part of the procedure to interpret the circumstances in a way that would be conducive to the claimant's cause and still within the lines of the strict directions in the Pringsheim, op. cit. n. 18 (1932), p. 215; cf. Zimmerman, op. cit. n. 1, p. 853. 23 See Riccobono, S., Cristianesimo e diritto privato, Rivista di diritto civile, vol. 3, 1911, pp. 37-70, p. 56; Pringsheim, F., Römische aequitas der christlichen Kaiser, in: Gesammelte Abhandlungen, Heidelberg, 1961 , pp. 224-246 (= Acta congressus iuridici internationalis, vol. I, Rim, 1934 D. 47, 4, 1, 1 (Ulp. 38 ad ed.). The fragment deals with an action against a slave who is directed in the will to be freed and then, after the death of his owner, he steals or destroys something from the inheritance before it has been accepted. In such a case no action would have been prescribed if it was not for such an interpretation of Labeo's, based on considerations of natural law. The fragment is attributed to Ulpian, a famous lawyer from the 3 rd century (more on Ulpian in Kunkel, op. cit. n. 3, pp. 245 sqq. and in Honoré, T., Ulpian. Pioneer of Human Rights, Oxford, 2002) , but it references Marcus Antistius Labeo, one of the most famous Roman civilian lawyers from the turn of the millennium (more on him in Kunkel, op. cit. n. 3, pp. 114 sq.) .
25
More on the characteristics of actiones stricti iuris in Kaser, M.; Hackl, K., Das rö-mische Zivilprozessrecht, München, 1996, p. 334.
praetor's formula. Zimmerman aptly substantiated this theory on the basis of D. 12, 1, 32 (Cels. 5 dig.), the famous Si et me et Titium fragment. 26, 27 In this fragment one person is asking two different persons to formally promise a loan by stipulatio. One of them directs his debtor to stipulate to give the loan to the potential borrower. After the stipulation, the borrower is in error regarding whose debtor made the stipulation. The question that arises is whether the borrower became the debtor in relation to the person who directed his debtor to make the stipulation or not. This matter is obviously within the realm of interpretation, and the basis for the final decision, in which it is stated that the obligation (and the corresponding action) indeed exists, is the fact that the most important aspect is not a lack of a contractual link between the creditor and the borrower, but the fact that the borrower in the end received the money belonging ultimately to the creditor, which should, for that reason, be subject to reimbursement. , vol. 32, 1985, pp. 247-255, p. 248 . More on the action in general in ibid., pp. 247 sqq. More on Celsus in Kunkel, op. cit. n. 3, pp. 146 sq.) ; admittedly, there is no mention of the condictio in the fragment. This is one of the reasons why, for example, Jan Hallebeek argues that the action in question was the so called actio in id quod pervenit and not a condictio (Hallebeek, J., The condiction as enrichment action in twelfth and thirteenth century legal scholarship, Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis, vol. 63, 1995, pp. 263-272, p. 265, n. 5 and Hallebeek, op. cit. (1985) , p. 247 sqq. More on this action in Schulz, F., Die actiones in id quod pervenit und in quantum to apply an interpretative tool such as equity without warping the principles of classical Roman law. In the present case, equity (explicitly bonum et aequum) does not entail some intangible principle of general justness, it is a specific and practical application of a commonsensical and sound rule that the obligation should exist between the person to whom the money originally belonged and the person to whom it was ultimately directed.
A similar conclusion could be reached regarding other instances of the association of the analysed principles and concepts with condictio claims. This applies especially in the case of the general principle from D. 50, 17, 206 (Pomp. 9 ex var. lect.), which explicitly mentions iniuria, meaning unlawfulness, as a basis for an enrichment detrimental to another and as such subject to reimbursement.
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For this reason, interpolationistic theories regarding the mentioned principles and references to nature, natural law, equity and the like, in association with the general prohibition of enrichment to the detriment of another and in the context of the condictio claims, are more recently generally rejected. 
THE CONNECTION OF PRINCIPLES ASSOCIATED WITH CONDICTIO CLAIMS WITH SPECIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS
In the previous part we have established that philosophical terminology in the context of condictio claims should not be considered a postclassical interpolation, and that it thus falls within the scope of pre-classical and classical law. locupletior factus est (inaugural Dissertation), Borna, 1905) . However, the fragment obviously deals with mutuum, for which condictio is a standard action (more on mutuum in Kaser, op. cit. n. 1 (1971) , pp. 539 sqq.; Kaser, op. cit. n. 1 (1975) , pp. 369 sq.; Zimmerman, op. cit. n. 1, pp. 153 sqq.) , and is situated under the rubric De rebus creditis si certum petetur et de condictione in the Digesta. Finally, even glossators considered the action in the fragment to be precisely a condictio (cf. Hallebeek, op. cit. (1995) , pp. 265 sqq.).
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More details on this in Mayer-Maly, T., Privatautonomie und Vertragsethik im Digestenrecht, IVRA, vol. 6, 1955, pp. 128-138, p. 136. 30 See Kaser, op. cit. n. 1 (1975) Therefore, the issue of specific philosophical thought or schools that may have influenced condictio claims essentially involves the Greek philosophical schools present in Rome in the pertinent time period. Generally speaking, Greek philosophy did not exert a more substantial influence in Rome before the period of the late Republic, and it began to affect Roman society some time during the course of the 2 nd century BC. 31 Seemingly, the general public was at first indisposed towards Greek philosophy, as it probably appeared to run contrary to the established morals and public order. That may be an explanation of the Senatus consultum de philosophis et rhetoribus from 161 BC, which prohibited Greek philosophers to permanently settle in Rome. 32 However, already in 156 BC the most famous Athenian philosophical schools, the Academic, the Stoic and the Peripatetic, established their branches in Rome, being represented by Carneades, Diogenes and Critolaus, respectively. This enabled a stronger influence of Greek philosophy in Rome. 33 Only two of those philosophical schools and their teachings have been brought into connection with the condictio claims and the pertinent principles in literature, namely Peripatetics and Stoics. 
The Aristotelian and Peripatetic concept of commutative justice
Prohibition of enrichment to the detriment of another has been brought into connection in literature with the Peripatetic, or essentially Aristotle's (4 th century BC) concept of justice. 35 37 This abstract concept of universal justice could be associated with law and morality in general. 38 However, this concept is not subject of his further analysis, where instead he deals in detail with justice in a particular sense.
39 This so-called particular justice is further divided into two types of justice. One of them is τὸ διανεμητικὸν δίκαιον (tò dianemetikòn díkaion), or distributive justice, meaning a type of justice dealing with the distribution of honours, wealth and other distributable goods in a community, according to which members of a community could be equal or unequal. 40 The other type of justice is τò διορθοτικòν δίκαιον (tò diorthotikòn díkaion), or commutative justice, and it is exactly this type of justice that has been associated with condictio claims, and therefore deserves a closer look.
Commutative justice deals with what Aristotle names συνάλλαγμα (synállag-ma). In the usual translation, the meaning of that word would be a contract or a covenant.
41 However, as it will be shown, not only contracts were covered by the term in Aristotle's text, so perhaps a better translation would be transactions, although even that should not be understood in a strictly legal sense. 42 To be more Besides, Aristotle maintains that commutative justice is achieved by establishing a just division of goods between relevant subjects, and gives a detailed account and a formula for how it may be achieved. 44 Further, Aristotle gives an example for the application of commutative or corrective justice. 45 He provides an illustration where one person injures or kills another, and then the judge has to establish a balance between them, since the act of injury on the one side and the corresponding suffering on the other constitute unequal parts in a division. Although Aristotle concedes that the following terms may not be applicable in all cases (the case of physical injury manifestly being one), he still defines such transactions as having a "profit" on one side and a "loss" on the other, and states that the role of the judge is to level them out.
When evaluating this Aristotle's treatise on justice, it should be noted that it is generally of a non-legal character. 46 More to the point, it serves as an introduction and context for his philosophical definition of commutative justice, and does not form part of a legal classification. Roughly, perhaps his division on voluntary and involuntary transactions could be associated with Roman obligationes ex contractu and ex delicto. 47 However, the question remains where in such a system condictio claims could be classified. Further, establishing a balance between two subjects according to the previously mentioned Aristotle's formula is definitely a worthy contribution to the concepts of justice and equity. However, it is not specifically applicable in the field of condictio claims. Generally speaking, the way in which the balance should be achieved in coordinated pecuniary relationships is fairly self-explanatory. The party that has been enriched to the detriment of another should be indebted to that person in the amount in which the detriment occurred, and no special formula, as the one Aristotle lays out, is actually needed for such a conclusion. In addition, Aristotle's example for commutative justice is completely inappropriate in the context of condictio claims. He describes a procedure (δίκη (díke)) in which a judge delivers a sentence against a person who injured or killed another person. While it could be argued that one person did suffer a detriment here, perhaps even pecuniarily calculable to the amount of pertinent medical (or funerary) expenses, the person inflicting the injury definitely did not gain anything legally relevant from such a "transaction" in itself. 49 The imbalance that Aristotle explains is an imbalance in the justice as a theoretical and abstract equilibrium existing between members of a society in status quo, which obviously cannot always be defined in pecuniary terms. For that reason, its application in any private legal context is dubious at best.
Finally, even on a general level, Aristotle's philosophy is not likely to have influenced Roman law in any relevant measure. For example, in other places in his work Aristotle explicitly condemns commercial activity oriented towards profit and loaning with interest. 50 This is something that obviously could not have been accepted as general ethics of Roman law, which dealt extensively with 48 As can be seen in the general literature on condictio claims cited in n. 1, in the Justinianic sources they are classified as obligations arising quasi ex contractu, which means that they are similar to but still sufficiently different from contracts (due to a lack of intention of the parties to create an obligation). More on delictual obligations in Roman law in Kaser, op. cit. n. 1 (1971) , pp. 609 sqq.; Kaser, op. cit. n. 1 (1975) , pp. 425 sqq.; Zimmerman, op. cit. n. 1, pp. 902 sqq.
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As has been noted previously, even Aristotle was aware of the questionable applicability of the terms "profit" and "loss" in the example. Cf. Wollschläger, op. cit. n. 8, pp. 44 sq.
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Ibid., pp. 45 sq. such matters and did not consider them to be unethical in themselves. This may be one of the reasons why Aristotle's and general Peripatetic concept of aspiring to medial ground as a perfect way to achieve justice and all the other virtues was marginalised in Rome, and was considered to be weak and without any practical significance. 51 It is not surprising, therefore, that not one Roman lawyer is considered to be a follower of the Peripatetic school.
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For all the abovementioned reasons, it is most likely that Aristotle's concept of commutative justice did not exert any significant influence on the Roman legal principles associated with condictio claims, especially prohibition of enrichment to the detriment of another. Aristotle's explication of justice in general, and of commutative justice in particular, is not particularly suitable for condictio claims and the accompanying principles in the sources. Consequently, any association of Aristotle's commutative justice in the context of condictio claims is probably a post facto connection between the two phenomena. Aristotle's concept is without a doubt a very valuable contribution to the philosophical concept of justice, but has no larger bearing in a strictly legal context, and it most likely did not have a role in the creation and application of the condictio claims in the pre-classical and classical Roman law.
Stoic prohibition of enrichment to the detriment of another
Another philosophical school that may have influenced philosophical principles associated with condictio claims is Stoicism. On a general level, Stoics are among the rare philosophical schools that left a significant trace in Rome.
53 Stoic ethics, the segment of Stoic philosophy most accepted in Rome 54 , dealt with the problem of permissible and impermissible human actions, thus being closely associated with Roman jurisprudence. 55 In the context of pre-classical and classical Roman law, in which condictio claims may have been influenced, primarily relevant are the so-called middle Stoics. The most prominent representatives thereof were Panaetius of 58 Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 BC), who may be said to have embodied an eclectic influence of Greek culture on Rome, was also under a strong influence of Stoic teachings. During the period of the middle Stoics he left a strong mark on Roman jurisprudence. 59 In the matters of justice and equity he is considered to have been under a direct influence of the main representatives of Stoic thought of the time, the already mentioned Panaetius and Posidonius. 60 For this reason, Cicero's work deserves a closer look in this analysis. In that context, prohibition of enrichment to the detriment of another may be brought into connection with a general prohibition of damage or of incurring an injury to another, which existed even in the early Stoic philosophy. 61 Cicero here declares how acquisition of property to the detriment of another is contrary to nature, and compares this phenomenon to calamities such as death, poverty, pain and any other infliction upon person or property.
Although this rule is not stated in writings defining basic Stoic principles, Cicero announces it with the words sed redeo ad formulam, thus defining it as a formula of Stoic ethics. 66 The relevance of this ethical maxim stems from a controversy between Academic and Stoic philosophy in the second century BC. These two schools, both represented in Rome, had a fundamental disagreement regarding the question whether one should behave honestly and honourably, or whether the best course of action is to pursue only that which is beneficial and advantageous for an individual (the conflict between honestum and utile).
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Philosopher This was unacceptable for Stoic philosophy and ethics. Cicero explicitly states that his teacher Posidonius considers the ethical conundrum of doing what is honestum or utile to be a matter of paramount importance in philosophy. 69 In Stoic ethics this problem is solved by arguing that while something is advantageous for one person and simultaneously disadvantageous or detrimental to another, it is not truly utile.
70 Such an ethical maxim does not prohibit behaviour the purpose of which is to achieve a more advantageous or beneficial position of an individual, it only prohibits such behaviour which concurrently damages another person. This ethical position was very welcome in Rome (as it is likely to be in any orderly functioning society). On the one hand, it does not burden advancement of a personal career or profit with the impression of apparent moral dubiousness. On the other hand, it establishes reasonable limits to advancement of personal gain, which enable every member of a given society to try to further one's interests while not infringing anybody and everybody else's.
The previously cited and analysed fragments of Pomponius, relevant in the context of the prohibition of enrichment to the detriment of another in Roman law in general, and with condictio claims and unjustified enrichment specifically, express an extremely similar ethical maxim. According to one of them, prohibition of enrichment detrimental to another person runs contrary to nature, and the other explicitly cites natural law as the basis for the same opinion. 71 Actually, the only relevant difference in relation to Cicero's expression of the Stoic formula is that Cicero, when explaining gain and loss, uses the phrases 68 Wollschläger, op. cit. n. 8, p. 47; Bund, op. cit. n. 31, pp. 132 
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This should not be surprising. Pomponius was a member of the Sabinian school, which is considered to have been under a stronger influence of Stoic teachings. 73 Besides that, not only the mentioned Pomponius fragments can be brought into connection with the Stoic school. As can be seen above, the other fragments dealing with condictio claims in classical Roman law overflow with references to concepts such as natura, ius naturae, ius gentium, aequitas, bonum et aequum and other derived terms. Those concepts can be most clearly associated with the Stoic philosophy.
74 Therefore, it could be concluded that the concept of prohibition of enrichment to the detriment of another, along with the general association of natural law, nature, equity and justice, etc. in the context of Wollschläger, op. cit. n. 8, pp. 55 sqq.) . Terminological pair commodum and incommodum, used by Cicero in the mentioned formula, is otherwise used in Digesta in the definition of property (bona), which is defined as comprising both commoda and incommoda (benefits and disadvantages) in D. 50, 16, 83 (Iav. 5 ex plaut.) . Also, the pair appears in D. 50, 17, 10 (Paul. 3 ad sab.) , where it is stated that it is in accordance with nature that the person enjoying commoda should also bear the burden of the pertinent incommoda: Secundum naturam est commoda cuiusque rei eum sequi, quem sequentur incommoda). Welt, vol. 36, 7 (Philosophie, Wissenschaften, Technik. Philosophie), Berlin, 1994, pp. 4851-4900, pp. 4866, 4879, 4893) . His conclusion is that while Stoic etymology may well have indeed been used, it did not bring any substantial change to the legal reasoning of Roman law (op. cit., pp. 4894 sq.) , which is actually very similar to the conclusion reached in this text in regard to the philosophical background of condictio claims.
condictio claims, in principle stem from the Stoic philosophy and ethics. 75 The question that remains is: what was the actual reach of this influence, or what role did the mentioned principles and concepts have in the creation and application of condictio claims in classical Roman law? These questions are addressed below.
THE RELEVANCE OF PHILOSOPHICAL PRINCIPLES FOR THE CLASSICAL CONDICTIO CLAIMS
Generally speaking, opinions on the scope of influence of Stoic philosophy on Roman law differ. In the older theory the view was held that concepts such as natural law, nature, equity, etc. stem from the Stoic philosophical school, and there were no doubts that they exerted a direct influence in many different areas of pre-classical and classical Roman law. 76 On the other hand, a repudiation of any substantial philosophical influence also exists in literature. Extant philosophical concepts in the sources are thus consequently attributed to a postclassical vulgarisation, abstract philosophical and moral concepts, Christianity and the like.
77 A sort of a median viewpoint holds that philosophical concepts and principles generally did not really have any substantial influence on Roman law. However, it is stated that they did have a very important role in the field of legal systematisation and categorisation, as well as regarding philosophemes and terminology taken over in Roman law from certain philosophical schools.
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This is very convincingly supported by Christian Wollschläger in Wollschläger, op. cit. n. 8, pp. 46 sqq. For a critique of this opinion see Kupisch, B., Ungerechtfertigte Bereicherung. Geschichtliche Entwicklungen, Heidelberg, 1987, p. 26, n. 38. 76 This opinion is primarily creditable to Moritz Voigt and his work Das jus naturale, aequum et bonum, und jus gentium der Römer (see Voigt, M., Das jus naturale, aequum et bonum und jus gentium der Römer II: das jus civile und jus gentium bei Römer, Leipzig, 1858) . See also Voigt, M., Römische Rechtsgeschichte II, Leipzig, 1899, especially pp. 97 sqq. (cf. Colish, op. cit. n. 74, p. 343). 77 Most insistently and famously by Emilio Albertario, cf. for example Albertario, op. cit. n. 15, pp. 277 sqq.; Albertario, op. cit. n. 30, pp. 3 sqq.; Colish, op. cit. n. 74, p. 355. Cf. Vander Waerdt, op. cit. n. 74, p. 4866. 78 Pringsheim, F., Jus aequum und jus strictum, in: Gesammelte Abhandlungen, Heidelberg, 1961 , pp. 131-153 (= Zeitschrift der Savigny Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte, Romanistische Abteilung, vol. 42, 1921 ; Pringsheim, op. cit. n. 18 (1932), pp. 173 sqq.; Zulueta, F. de, The Development of Law under the Republic, in: Cook, S. A. et al. (eds.), Cambridge Ancient History, vol. 9, Cambridge, 1932, pp. 842-881, pp. 868 sqq.; Buckland, W. W., Classical Roman Law, in: Cook, S. A. et al. (eds.) This theory is most likely closest to the truth. However, the specific subject of condictio claims deserves a closer look.
One of the first things to point out in that context is the fact that the prohibition of enrichment to the detriment of another, associated with condictio claims, is not only associated with nature generally, but also explicitly with natural law, or ius naturale. 79 In that way a more specific and concrete legal outlook is assumed, and matters are not dealt with on an intangible philosophical level. This is not a coincidence. In the Roman legal system matters such as equity, justice, etc. have a very important role, but they can be taken into account only inasmuch as they may be realised within the confines of the ius civile. 80 This by no means implies a necessarily rigid legal formalism. This assertion may be explained by the famous definition of ius as ars boni et aequi, where the law is considered to be the art of what is good and righteous. 81 In such a system, equity and justice are actually realised through ius, and for that reason ius holds a sort of a primary and principal position through which justice is achieved, and not the other way around, according to which justice may be considered a general philosophical concept with which ius may or may not be in tune, or only to an extent. In that sense, jurisprudence has a sort of a sacred duty of actualising justice and bringing it to life through interpretation and application of the law. So, in the context of condictio claims as well as in other areas of Roman law, philosophical concepts and principles above all have a strong and explicit legal outlook, and should not be dismissed on account of their apparent intangible philosophical nature.
Further, if we consider influence of the Stoic philosophemes and terminology to exist only on a superficial level, this does not mean that essentially similar principles did not exist underneath, in the internal system of Roman law and its inherent disposition towards actualisation of equity and justice within the confines of ius civile. In other words, elements from the Stoic philosophy and ethics may have been used to justify and reinvigorate concepts both essentially and strictly legal (and not merely or mainly philosophical) and distinctively Roman. As a matter of fact, Cicero is known to have used Stoicism to justify religious or moral attitudes which had a different, autonomous origins. 82 For example, Cicero invokes the bellum iustum procedure from the history of Rome as a good example of an ethical and orderly initiation of war. 83 With that, he associates just war as an ethical concept, adequate for the Stoic philosophy and ethics, with an ancient Roman concept from ius fetiale in which such an ethical concept is considered to have been embodied. 84 In the mentioned example, orderly and just initiation of war as an ethically desirable matter in the Stoic philosophy is supported by an ancient Roman practice, most likely in order to give the concept a guise of authority and Roman authenticity. A similar thing may have happened, although the other way around, in the field of condictio claims. Stoic ethical concepts such as equity, natural law, justice, etc., as well as the Stoic prohibition of enrichment to the detriment of another, being very popular in the period of pre-classical and classical Roman law, may have been used to justify an otherwise completely Roman concept from earlier times. Most important instances of the use of condictio claims in classical Roman law were either already covered by the ancient legis actio per condictionem, or were closely associated with it and originated from the same legal reasoning. 85 Although legis actio per condictionem was the youngest of the legis actiones, stemming most likely from some time between the end of the third and first half of the second century BC 86 , it still predated the most fruitful period of influence of middle Stoicism on Roman jurisprudence, which happened in the subsequent periods, as laid out above. Therefore, the aim of Cicero's formula may have been to re-affirm an ethical principle that was in the legal field actually already essentially embodied in the application of the legis actio per condictionem. Association of condictio claims with concepts such as 82 Colish, op. cit. n. 74, p. 127. 83 CIC. rep. II, xvii, 31 and III, xxiii, 35, as well as CIC. off. I, xi, 36. More on this procedure in Kaser and Hackl, op. cit. n. 25, pp. 111 sqq. and Held, H.-R., Podrijetlo postupka legis actio per condictionem, Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta u Zagrebu, vol. 67, no. 2, 2017, pp. 197-227, pp. 201 sqq., with references to sources and further literature. 84 Cf. Hausmaninger, H., "Bellum iustum" und "iusta causa belli" im älteren römischen Recht, Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, vol. 9, no. 3-4, 1961, pp. 335-345, pp. 342 sqq. 85 See literature in n. 1. Cf. Held, op. cit. n. 83. 86 Kaser, Hackl, op. cit. n. 25, p. 111, n. 5 and 6. justice and equity, in fact, should not be surprising in the least, since the legis actio per condictionem procedure in its original application was closely associated with the concepts of iustum and fides.
87
In that way an imprint of Stoic philosophy on Roman law may have been the use of Stoic terminology and general guise of Stoic ethics by Roman lawyers to justify legal reasoning already extant in Roman legal sources regardless of the Greek philosophy. Consequently, although superficially Stoic, invocation of principles such as natural law, equity and the like was not an un-Roman philosophising or an imposition of an extra-legal and supra-legal principle. 88 It was an affirmation of the application of a perfectly sound legal logic, based on an already existing matter of Roman law. In the part of this text dealing with the problem of the origins of the principles and concepts associated with condictio claims, in the context of the famous Si et me et Titium fragment (D. 12, 1, 32 (Cels. 5 dig.)), it was mentioned how in at least one instance a condictio claim was granted by interpretation and taking into account that which is right and fair (bonum et aequum). Consequently, even if the respective principles did help an interpretative widening of the scope of condictio claims and their application to situations unenvisaged previously in the legis actio per condictionem strictly speaking, they still followed the same logic and never fell outside its conceptual scope. 89 With such a conclusion, the use of Stoic elements in the context of condictio claims may neither be considered their conceptual root, nor a postclassical philosophical addition. However, it should also not be considered only an embellishment, a fad of the time used for the sake of itself. It may well have been, we hope to have at least convincingly suggested, a reinvigoration and a reaffirmation of a perfectly sound and typically Roman legal matter with the spirit of the times.
CONCLUSION
The problem of the philosophical background of the condictio claims in classical Roman law, while being an intricate matter, is of such a nature that a possible 87 More on this in Held, op. cit. n. 83, pp. 197 sqq. Cf. Kaser, op. cit. n 1 (1971) Koschaker, vol. II, Milano, 1954, pp. 425-437, pp. 436 sq.; Colish, op. cit. n. 74, pp. 365 sqq. Similar conclusion is reached by Vander Waerdt regarding the ostensibly Stoic philosophical concept of natural law in the classical Roman jurisprudence (Vander Waerdt, op. cit. n. 74, pp. 4887, 4894 sq.) . 89 Cf. the emphasis on abstractness of both legis actio per condictionem and condictio claims in Zimmerman, op. cit. n. 1, p. 835. explanation of one issue associated with it inevitably has consequences for all the other different aspects. In that sense, the viewpoint that the philosophical references in the context of condictio claims most likely have pre-classical and classical roots narrows down possible philosophical influences, and helps to determine their actual scope. In order to achieve more clarity and an orderly exposition of the argument, this text has dealt with the three mentioned matters separately.
There are no serious reasons to doubt the pre-classical and classical origins of principles and concepts such as natura, ius naturale, aequitas, etc., explicitly associated in the sources with the prohibition of enrichment to the detriment of another and with condictio claims. With that, the matter of their inspiration is narrowed down to certain Greek philosophical schools. Although often associated with condictio claims, Aristotle's and the Peripatetic concept of commutative justice actually has little or no importance for them. A more direct line of influence, most notably in Cicero's work, can be found in relation to the Stoic prohibition of enrichment to the detriment of another, along with all the other principles and concepts of Stoic philosophy and ethics in the relevant context. Finally, the mentioned principles and concepts may be considered to have had a specific role in the matter. They definitely did not give cause to the creation of condictio claims, which were rooted in the ancient Roman legis actio per condictionem, although they did on occasion help widen the application of condictio claims via interpretation, all the while maintaining their essential function. The analysed principles and concepts were also most likely not only mere verbiage or a suitable decoration. We hope that we have demonstrated that they at least possibly were a tool for reaffirming a typical and ancient Roman legal principle already embodied in the application of legis actio per condictionem. Justinian, vol. 1-4, Philadelphia, 1985) .
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